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Abstract: 
This essay aims to reflect on the idea of landscape and our relationship with it by taking the 
Japanese notion of furusato (native place) in its ontological dimension. Grounded on 
Heidegger’s ‘phenomenology of Being’ and ‘ontology’, it will be developed a 
phenomenological understanding of fieldwork experience in a Japanese rural community in 
order to rethink both the furusato and the ‘Being-landscape’ relation. As a consequence, we will 
be concerned not with how people speak about landscape, but with how the landscape speaks 
through people. What will be brought to light are the landscape’s moral and relational 
dimensions: namely, (i) the responsibility towards both our communities and future generations 
and (ii) a more-than-physical understanding of landscape that alerts us to our belonging to a 
common world comprised of relationships and tasks. 
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§1. Introduction 
The landscape, as a theme of inquiry and reflection, is found within a mesh-work 
of definitions and theoretical approaches. Its recurring presence both in academic and 
popular thinking reveals its significance for the human condition, namely, in the 
development of a sense of belonging (Relph 1976; Tuan 1974). In Japanese society, the 
rural landscape in particular is embedded with an affective dimension evoked through 
concepts like satoyama 里山, genfūkei 原風景 or furusato 故郷. During the summer 
vacations and the New Year, thousands of Japanese travel to their hometowns in a 
generalized movement that largely surpasses the dimension of what we witness, for 
example, in Europe – these journeys are called satogaeri 里帰り (return to the village): 
the journey to one’s furusato (native place) is considered as a homecoming, a return to 
one’s own origins (Berque 1997, 178–79). The idea of furusato  is also evoked 
throughout several dimensions of Japanese society and culture: in the popular 1914 
song Furusato;  the 1983 Sejirō Koyama’s movie with the same name; in Enka ballads 
(Yano 2010, 168–78); in television broadcasts, advertisement and travel companies 
(Robertson 1998, 119–21); or through the concept of furusatozukuri (native place-
making) (Robertson 1994, cap. 1). The affection for the landscape (fūkei 風景 ), 
manifested through several concepts, ideas and areas of social life is in line with a long 
tradition of praise for the Japanese landscape, but most particularly with Shiga 
Shigetaka’s 1894 famous book Nihon Fūkeiron/Treatise on Japanese Landscape, a work 
with nationalistic overtones written to promote the uniqueness of Japanese geography 
(Gavin 2010).  A tradition that, as ‘landscape theory’ (fūkeiron), is said to characterize a 
genre of documentary filmmaking emerging in Japan at the end of 1960’s, where 
landscapes acquire a more central role in the telling of a story (Furuhata 2007). 
When these ramifications, idealizations, nostalgia and appeal for the landscape 
in Japan are dealt with by scholars, they fit broadly into two different approaches: (i) 
within the field of ecological and environmental sustainability studies, where it is 
addressed through the concept of ‘satoyama’ and valued as a sustainable model of 
interaction between humans and their environments (Berglund et al. 2014; Iwata et al. 
2010; Takeuchi et al. 2003); and (ii) within the social sciences, where the landscape is 
addressed mainly through the idea of furusato (hometown, native place) and turned into 
an object of a certain historical objectivism as an ‘invented tradition’ (Hobsbawm 
1983): an ideal, encouraged by the government and instrumentalized by the media, 
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travel companies and the like, in order to promote nostalgic and nationalistic feelings in 
Japanese people or turn it into a commodity (Ben-Ari 1992; Creighton 1997; Ivy 1995, 
cap. 4, 103–108; Robertson 1988, 1998; Vlastos 1998, pt. 2).  
Our main contention is directed at this second approach. By focusing on the 
historical contexts or “origins” of the bearers or authors of a certain tradition, idea or 
text, the ‘invention of tradition’ and its theoretical derivatives assume they are 
uncovering their real meaning of tradition. However, the problem is not they are wrong 
about the facts that support their critiques on a certain idea or tradition, but that they are 
mistaken, so to speak, regarding the nature of tradition itself, i.e., of what comes to us 
from the past. A tradition, an idea or a text stands the test of time not because of its 
inertia, but because it is continuously readapted, embraced and cultivated anew 
throughout time (Gadamer 1975, 293; see also Connerton 1989). Thus, what a tradition, 
idea or text means is not understood by explaining or debunking its historical or 
particular contexts, but by engaging with what it says, it’s ‘subject matter’1.  
In short, by setting aside the critical nature in the second approach, this essay 
aims to illustrate how the furusato and its ‘subject matter’ can lead towards different 
considerations regarding our common understanding of landscape, the places we inhabit 
and our relationship with them. Nevertheless, when fieldwork is involved, reassessing 
these issues from a different perspective entails taking a different stance regarding our 
encounters with people as well: what we could call a phenomenological-oriented 
account of human affairs. Accordingly, and grounded on Heidegger’s ‘phenomenology 
of Being’, as well as in his account of ‘ontology’, in Being and Time, this essay will 
attempt to bring to light a phenomenological understanding of some fieldwork 
experiences in Kazemura 2 , a Japanese rural community, in order to rethink the 
landscape ontologically: i.e., not by taking it as an object, describing what people have 
to say about their village, but by disclosing how an understanding of landscape reveals 
itself out of their practical undertakings in their being-in-the-word. 
Informing the ‘cultural dialogue’ that lies in this essay’s background, is a view 
of ethnography that takes its encounters with people in the world as it takes its 
encounters with authors or philosophers on paper: not simply by repeating, describing 
                                                 
1  For a more detailed account on these issues see Marshall Sahlins’ direct critique of the 
‘invention of tradition’ (Sahlins 1999) and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s account on the nature of 
tradition (Gadamer 1975, 289–302). 
2 This is a fictional name. Any resemblance with an actual place is a coincidence. 
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or systematizing what one hears or learns, but by using a particular experience, thought 
or turn of phrase as an insight to reflect anew on a certain issue – or, as Ingold (2014, 
291–92) puts it “to improve our perceptual, moral and intellectual faculties for the 
critical tasks that lie ahead” 3. 
 
§2. On ‘Being’ and ‘ontology’  
In Heidegger’s Being and Time lies a substantial transformation of (i) the 
understanding our most primordial mode of being in the world and (ii) the nature of our 
investigations into human affairs.  
For the German philosopher, human beings are better characterized by the 
notion of Dasein (Being-there). Dasein is distinguished from all other entities by the 
fact that in its mode of being, its Being is an issue for it. (1962, 32/12). Dasein’s main 
characteristic, then, is to be concerned with the possibilities of its own Being. 
Additionally, Dasein’s Being is always-already thrown up in the world before he starts 
to make meanings out of it – as Heidegger writes, “Dasein is already ahead of itself” 
(1962, 236). In other words, being-ahead-of-itself is a condition of Dasein that directs 
him towards his own (future) possibilities of being. This structure of Being is comprised 
in the notion of ‘Care’ (Sorge), not as a reflexive state (worry or concern), but 
ontologically, as being towards (1962, 237).  
This account of Being is a consequence of Heidegger’s need to reformulate 
language to convey his message, but the fundamental idea behind it, although with 
substantially different outcomes, can be traced back to Husserl’s ‘intentionality’: the 
idea that ‘to be conscious, is to be conscious of something’; there is always something 
towards which we are in the world. One of the main differences between Heidegger and 
Husserl is that the former, although never using such a term, builds his own idea of 
intentionality by refusing to focus on consciousness itself, but on a level prior to our 
being-conscious-of-consciousness (for a comparison between both thinkers see Crowell 
2005). The major consequence of this reformulation is that, for Heidegger, the most 
fundamental way we cope with things around us is not as objects of perception, but 
                                                 
3 A stance close to what has been called an “ethnographically based philosophical anthropology” 
(Wentzer e Mattingly 2018): an effort to engage in a more humane dialogue within 
Anthropology and to expand the particularism of our reflections into a more humanistic 
endeavor. 
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rather as instrumental items of our most ordinary practical activities – it is, 
fundamentally, a praxis-oriented account of Being. Thus, Being is not some entity or 
essence embedded within a physical subject, but a continuous action of intentional 
“circumspection” (umsicht) constitutive of our own thrownness in the world. Charles 
Guignon (2005, 397) summarizes it: “As ex-sisting (from ex-sistere, standing outside 
itself) Dasein is always-already ‘out there’, engaged in undertakings, directed toward its 
realization”. 
Heidegger’s phenomenological account of Being seems to be in harmony with 
our most primordial ways of engaging with the world. In fact, when the world is first 
disclosed to us, we are already coping with it, practically absorbed in our undertakings. 
We are always-already articulating an awareness of the world, or a part of it, by 
understanding ourselves through what we do, the context where we are doing it and the 
purposes of doing it. The posture of becoming subjects in opposition to a world of 
objects is a secondary attitude we take towards what surrounds us – it is only when 
things do not proceed as expected, that we inquire the world as something open for 
explanation and observation. 
However, embracing this interpretation of Being means taking it not only as a 
theoretical tool, but as a practical orientation of how to make sense of what we 
experience during fieldwork – this takes us back to the initial claim for a 
phenomenological-oriented account of human affairs. If we take the primordial mode of 
being human as being always-already engaged in the world before casting judgments 
on it, it is crucial to reformulate our ways of looking, inquiring and interpreting concrete 
human activities. It is right in the Introduction of Being and Time (1962, sec. 3 and 4) 
that we find some remarks (grounded on the previous account of Being) of how to 
reformulate our investigations on human affairs into an ontological inquiry. 
In Heidegger’s view, there is a fundamental distinction between two kinds of 
questions that we can do regarding entities in the world: ontological questions, about 
the modes of being of entities; and ontic questions, about the proprieties and 
characteristics of entities. What is ontological can never be discovered through an ontic 
investigation, no matter how much one describes the characteristics of an object.  
If we attempt the same exercise with the Japanese landscape, we could answer 
ontically by referring to its distinctive visual, aesthetic or physical features or, as we 
saw before, taking it in its ideological, historical or sociological particularities. However, 
what these answers accomplish fails to give us an understanding of why the landscape 
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comes to occupy such a central place within Japanese society and how its mode of being 
is articulated in the practical engagements of its inhabitants. In an ontological answer, 
on the other hand, we should try to disclose the meanings that the landscape articulates 
and how it manifests itself in people’s being-in-the-world.  
In Watsuji Tetsurō and Augustin Berque, we find two distinct ontological 
answers concerning Japanese landscape. Watsuji builds his answer philosophically, 
starting from a critique of Heidegger’s lack of focus on the ‘collective’ (spatiality) in 
Being and Time. His notion of fūdo4 風土 tried to grasp the relational moment when 
humans meet landscape and understand themselves from within that relation – as he 
defined it: “fūdo is the structural moment of human existence” (Watsuji 1979, 3). From 
that “structural moment”, when humans “step out into” (sotoni deru 外に出る) the 
landscape, Watsuji tells us, specific and material expressions take form, such as culinary 
forms, construction types and so on (1979, 17–19). On the other hand, Berque addresses 
and builds directly on Watsuji’s fūdo and present us some shared cultural values that are 
commonly associated with the landscape in Japanese myths, literature, poetry and 
religious beliefs. For example, according to Berque (1997, 120–28, 171–86), the ‘word’ 
sato (village; part of the word furu-sato) carries a strong maternal component associated 
with the idea of uterus, making, along with yama (mountain) a polarity easily 
discernible: sato, ‘village’, a bas-relief zone and the place of the maternal, human and 
ordinary; yama, ‘mountain’, an high relief zone and the place of the paternal, sacred and 
extraordinary.. 
Both authors do sketch an answer to an ontological question about landscape. 
However, due to the nature of their inquiries (a philosophical and a cultural study), they 
do it by leaving out real human beings in real, practical engagements with the places 
they live in. In the specific case of Watsuji this shortcoming is more obvious. His fūdo 
strikes us with a deep ontological understanding of the relation between humans and 
landscape and can be taken as a (helpful) starting point for our inquiry. Nevertheless, 
and although it alerts us to “that structural moment” when humans “step out into” the 
landscape and understand themselves for the first time, it ends up in deterministic-like 
discussions on different types of climate and their effect on human behavior. In the 
                                                 
4 Fūdo, instead of ‘climate’ (as translated by Bownas in Watsuji 1988), which does not properly 
convey Watsuji’s intentions, is translated by Berque with the French word ‘milieu’ (Berque 
1997, 2004). 
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remainder of this essay, on the contrary, by developing this inquiry from real people in a 
real community, our ontological answer will try to surpass the shortcomings in 
Watsuji’s. 
  
§3. The relational landscape 
During the first days in Kazemura, I realized that the idea of furusato would turn 
out to be an important trigger for my inquiries on the relation between humans and the 
places they inhabit. My goal was never to explore the idea of furusato itself during 
fieldwork, but because I was working on the theme of landscape it was only natural that 
this word would come up somewhere along the path. However, the way that its meaning 
was unveiled, led me to reformulate my pre-established aims and to rethink what can be 
encompassed by the notion of ‘landscape’. In one of my first dialogs with the village’s 
kachō, I was presented with a fresh view on what furusato meant to him. He said: 
“When I think about furusato I imagine a temporal continuum, a line. I am here – he 
said pointing somewhere between a scale he made with his hands -, furusato is this link 
formed between the ancestors and the next generations. The position that, in the present, 
both I and the community occupy, assigns us with a kind of responsibility in 
maintaining that same connection between these two poles: the ancestors and the next 
generations.”  
 The simple reference to the ancestors as a landscape’s element could lead us to 
remarks of religious or ritual nature (see Smith 1974), but for the particular goals of this 
this essay, I would like to take a slightly different look at it. The majority of human 
cultures and societies exhibit a clear relationship between religion and the ancestors, but 
if we try to avoid the most obvious answers, it is easy to realize that prior to a religious 
expression, the deep respect for the ancestors constitutes a certain moral understanding 
of what it means to be human: namely, to be in a relation, i.e., in a “practice of concern”, 
with what the ancestors left us (Traphagan 2004). And in the case of the furusato, this 
intergenerational responsibility gets less religious if we consider that it is also directed 
to the next generations – it could be thought of closer to a moral understanding of how 
to orient ourselves in the world. It encapsulates an attentive and humble consideration 
for the wisdom that has been left by the previous generations who lived in a particular 
place. It is not just the simple idea of saying that the ancestors still live there somehow, 
but the bare acknowledgment that, just like we own our parents a great deal for who we 
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are today, we own the previous generations the possibility of living in the places we 
currently live. If we consider the places we inhabit from this perspective, we can think 
of the human beings as the bare bones that support the landscape (or the furusato). 
Hence, the landscape is the temporal link maintained by human beings at every 
moment; and, as a link, it morally implies other human beings who lived, live or will 
live in a particular place.  
The experience of life in Kazemura embodied, to a great extent, what the 
furusato seems only to imply. In fact, on several occasions, I could not avoid but to 
notice a constant reinforcement of bonds between people: when they met by accident 
and exchanged impressions about the work they were doing in the village; when they 
greeted me and each other with words regarding the effort the other was putting into his 
undertakings; or even when, in communitarian tasks organized by groups, one group 
would promptly helped the other when their own task was done. This dynamic allowed 
me to think the whole that is the landscape not so much through the physical space itself, 
but through a certain sense of caring for a common world; through human beings and 
their relationships with others and with the places where they live in. 
In short, both the kachō’s words about the furusato and the sense of cooperation 
that permeated the village led me to reconsider the premises behind my inquiry and to 
focus, not in what the human being thinks about his relationship with the landscape, but 
in the human himself as a landscape inhabitant. Would it be possible to free the idea of 
landscape solely from its physical and visual dimensions and to approach it from its 
relational dimension: namely, as that against which they first understand themselves (as 
Watsuji’s fūdo tries to convey) and their common world? And within that relational 
dimension, consider it, not only through the connection between generations (like the 
furusato), but also from the relations where, in the present, people are inevitably 
embedded? These questions bring us back to Heidegger. 
In section §2 there was a crucial idea we started to postulate and that we can 
summarize now: that theoretical intentionality is always preceded by practical 
intentionality. One thing is to describe the world and its components as objects of 
perception; another one, entirely different, is to bring that same world to light through 
our own acquaintance with it and the ways it discloses itself to us in our practical 
activities (i.e., as ready-to-hand) before we philosophize about it. In the first case, we 
tend to separate ourselves from the world, atomize it into entities independent from the 
activities that give them meaning and construct theoretical propositions and judgments 
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about them. In the second case, on the contrary, we do not look at things and build an 
analysis of them, but grasp their existential weight from within a totality of activities 
and tasks they are already a part of. Phenomenologically speaking, Being is always-
already articulating an understanding of some part of the world as he moves through it, 
engaging in relational and practical undertakings. In a certain sense, then, we can say 
that the above account on the furusato ends up meeting this phenomenology of Being 
halfway, for the understanding of landscape enclosed within the furusato comes forth 
already as the practical, relational and moral undertakings of human beings. Thus, the 
landscape is first manifested and articulated in its inhabitants’ being-in-the-world, and 
not as a physical substrate or object of perception. 
When arguing critically about the sensitive act, Merleau-Ponty (1962, 185–86) 
makes a similar claim: “every empiricist thesis is reversed: the state of consciousness 
becomes the consciousness of a state, […] the world becomes the correlative of thought 
about the world”. As an effort to undo this ‘step ahead’ in our philosophical analysis, he 
reverses the way we normally conceive the sensitive act. In order for something to be 
felt by me, he argues, “I must find the attitude which will provide it with the means of 
becoming determinate, of showing up [as something concrete]”. In this way, “I can see 
blue because I am sensitive to colors; so if I wanted to render precisely the perceptual 
experience, I ought to say that one perceives in me, and not that I perceive” (1962, 191–
93). Starting our inquiries from the premise ‘I feel/see’ means, then, that we are already 
one step ahead in the act of perception. In order for us to feel/see, we had already 
developed a certain attitude of attunement with the world: the world is already 
perceived in us, before we take it as an empirical entity. 
Nevertheless, when we look into some classics of landscape literature, we almost 
invariably find this ‘step ahead’: in the performative act of walking through landscape 
(Wylie 2005); through arguments of landscape as language (Spirn 1998) and text 
(Barnes e Duncan 1992); as the object of iconographic studies (Daniels e Cosgrove 
1988); or constituted as a relation between spatial conceptions of foreground vs. 
background (Hirsch e O’Hanlon 1995) – in these works the authors start, right from the 
beginning, to objectify our relations with the landscape making it an detached entity. 
They start their inquiry already too late, in the ‘I/we/they perceive’ stage.  
It should be clear by now, then, that reassessing the landscape ontologically 
means taking the practical engagements of daily life as the starting point of the inquiry: 
before the human being perceives the landscape, one perceives it in him – it speaks 
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through him in his practical engagements with it. And the ways it is articulated through 
his daily tasks and casual speech, tell us more about the primordial relation with it than 
an utterance about it. In short, in our next step we should not focus on what people 
eventually say regarding their village and its landscape, but from their daily actions and 
relations in their being-in-the-world. 
 
§4. Jon’nobi: work ethics 
The major difference to be noted within Kazemura, in contrast with the common 
understanding of nature in Japan (and across the West when we talk about landscape), is 
that the intimacy with the landscape is developed, not through contemplation or by 
stating the village’s geographical or aesthetic qualities, but by means of the works and 
tasks required throughout the village and their verbalization. Within the community, the 
landscape came forth, in daily life, by the act of caring for it as the common world that 
it is. 
On one occasion, I had the following chat with a woman that was helping her 
husband planting a few big rice fields with a machine. Knowing that that I had planted 
rice by hand a few days ago, she asked me about it. When I said that it was a fun 
(tanoshii) experience, she replied: “When I was young we planted the entire village by 
hand – that wasn’t fun at all!” Naturally, the fact that she did not think of it as ‘fun’ was 
due to the hardships she had experienced when rice-planting machines were not a part 
of the farming process. But on the other hand, on several other occasions that we spoked 
or that I helped her, her attitude regarding the doing of her tasks in the village showed a 
certain satisfaction, or pleasure, that was not supposed to be present in something that is 
not ‘fun’ – and it was not only in her that this was perceptible. As I gradually grew 
better acquainted with people around the village, engaging with them by means of small 
chats or the communitarian tasks we did together, I was able to see reflected in most of 
them that same attitude. Beyond the obligation that comes with the fact that rice farming 
were the means of sustenance for most households, the actual disposition and stance 
towards work was not one of an inevitable burden one carries with him. Rather, it was 
closer to a sense of duty and respect towards those who, within eyesight, were also 
absorbed in their own tasks. Mostly in communitarian tasks (where my engagement and 
participation were more substantial), the work was normally done with a great diligence 
and a shared sense of commitment in caring for the village. Some tasks were naturally 
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hard sometimes, but the ability to keep a good spirit endured. Somewhat unfamiliar with 
this mood, there was something that gradually gained some weight for me: there seemed 
to be an understanding of work somehow different from how we usually consider it. 
With these remarks we will not try to unveil an inconsistency between what 
people say and what people do, but only an indication that deeper meanings can emerge 
when we grasp how ‘things’ speak through people, rather than when people speak about 
‘things’. As Ingold (2002a, 147) puts it, “a way of speaking is, in itself, a way of living 
in the land”. It “celebrates an embodied knowledge of the world that is already shared 
thanks to people’s mutual involvement in the tasks of habitation”. At this point, then, 
more than a social scientist attitude of critical analysis, we should let our own human 
inquisitiveness take the lead by taking the encounter with morally or culturally different 
outlooks on the world as a possible source of new questions and inspirations. Hereafter, 
we could, eventually, embrace in a critical analysis of work, revealing the supposed 
Japanese ‘work mentality’ at play. But doing it would block the possibility of learning 
something meaningful with this community; and we would be answering ontic 
questions while ignoring the ontological ones. The question of work (or tasks), then, is 
crucial to formulate, not only the core argument of this essay, but also a local word I 
will explore next: jon’nobi (じょんのび). 
The word jon’nobi first came across while planning my journey to Kazemura – 
yet, its meaning was never clear. It was during my stay, that the kachō lent me a book 
titled Jon’nobi – an inspiring book, without a doubt, almost a philosophical treatise on 
the aesthetics of planting rice and vegetables and working with nature. I was then told 
that the word jon’nobi was a local dialect used only in around half of the prefecture of 
Niigata and that the book was compiled around two decades ago by a few inhabitants 
from Kazemura and other communities nearby. Since it is charged with a blend of both 
physical and emotional components, is difficult to express it within a single definition, 
but the main idea behind it is the following: “the feeling of entering the ofuro after 
finishing a long day of hard work, from sunrise to sunset”. The word articulates, then, a 
feeling of wellness comprising both a physical (the pleasure of being immersed in hot 
water) and moral dimension (being able to carry a certain task, with dedication, until the 
end – we can think of it as a good fatigue). Actually, most of the book revolves around 
this idea: the wellbeing that stems from both a sense of accomplishment in one’s own 
work and from the possibility of enjoying the fruits of one’s own labor. In a sense, it 
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gives us a possible insight into how these people understand the value, not necessarily 
of the landscape, but of a life dedicated to the community.  
Along with this word, another word that led me to mull over the role of work in 
this community was ‘ikigai’ 生き甲斐, a word also mentioned in the book. Ikigai is an 
ordinary Japanese word that means ‘life’s goal’, or how the French say it ‘raison d’être’. 
It can be understood as “what one most deeply live for”, articulated between individual 
urges and social commitments (Mathews 1996a, see also 1996b). Within the horizon of 
this book, the ikigai pointed towards the dedication to the community, its maintenance 
and the possibility of enjoying what it can offer; and from its narrative is absent any 
reference to a quantitative conception of work, its economic or cost-effective 
dimensions. What is manifest, instead, is the pleasure and affection that one develops 
during and after the maintenance of the rice fields, roads, irrigation systems – of the 
whole community. It is mainly a matter of moral attunement with the place one lives, 
even if trough weariness. The word itself can enlighten our argument: it literally means 
‘value in living’, where ‘iki’ is the stem of the verb ‘ikiru’, 生きる, means ‘to live’ and 
‘gai’, 甲斐, stands for ‘effect’, ‘result’ or ‘value’. Furthermore, in this word, the last 
character, 斐, ‘i’ means ‘patterned’ or ‘beautiful’. In its constitution, the word ikigai 
already encapsulates and articulates ideas of ‘value’ and ‘pleasure’; pleasure in seeing 
the ‘patterned’ and the ‘beautiful’ taking shape in front of our eyes through our own 
actions, our own work. 
In the book mentioned earlier, there is also the following passage: “When the 
sun hides, one stops working. And, at home, there is dinner. Our generation doesn’t 
have pleasure in being seated; it feels good to move one’s body. Weekends are no 
reason to rest. Working is our satisfaction, our hobby; our ikigai”. These words might 
sound strong for some of us. And maybe this is because we are used to consider work as 
an obligation, as something that, if we could, we wouldn’t do. On the other hand, any 
one of us is aware of the wellbeing that stems from finishing a certain job or task that 
we carried out with genuine will; the pleasure in contemplating and resting after 
finishing something made by our own hands – in other words, jon’nobi. 
Both words (jon’nobi and ikigai) and the morality they enclose unlock the 
possibility of reflecting on the question of work from a non-economic standpoint. In this 
connection, work is not necessarily understood as the hand of human reason over nature, 
but as an act of growing; a compliance to “a productive dynamic that is immanent in the 
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natural world itself, rather than converting nature to an instrument” (Ingold 2002a, 81). 
In her book, Crafting Selves, Dorinne Kondo alerts us to the interconnection between 
humans, work and world, as expressed in her interlocutor’s speech, where the notion of 
ikigai also comes forth:  
 
In Ohara-san’s [the factory’s chief artisan] narrative of work and life, the ultimate satisfaction was to 
be found in experiencing work as ikigai, a reason for living. This artisanal ideal, based on certain 
forms of learning and on a notion of maturity forged through the hardships of apprenticeship, 
involves another level of meaning. Self-realization through one’s art arises from certain kinds of 
relationships between people, their tools, the material world, and nature (Kondo 1990, 241). 
 
There is both a ‘hardship’ (kurō) and ‘aesthetic’ dimension of work. In both 
Kondo’s interlocutors and in Kazemura, the hardship and poetry of work are visible in 
the way people talk about their undertakings, since, in both cases, work is faced as 
cooperation with the cycle of nature, with the passing of the seasons. Following Kondo, 
we should also consider the enthusiasm and aesthetics of speech and take them seriously, 
for they also exist as the way identity is formed: says: “clearly, work mobilizes emotion 
and draws upon aesthetic sensibilities, even a certain spirituality, in ways that contradict 
our expectations about ‘mere’ craft or industrial work” (1990, 255).  
These ideas are present in the notion of jon’nobi as well: the emphasis on hard 
work along with an aesthetic or poetic verbalization of it. Naturally, in Kazemura’s case, 
the obvious feeling of cooperation with the natural world reinforces even further this 
aesthetics of work. 
 
§5. The Landscape as an extension of consciousness 
The philosopher Edward Casey (2001, 417) called the landscape a “detotalized 
totality of places”. However, there is, it seems, something missing in this definition. 
Besides the physical dimension that this definition evokes (even if in its ‘infinity’ or 
‘incompletion’), there is also something that gradually takes shape in human 
consciousness that gives human beings a sense of belonging to a community and 
surpasses the physical aspect of a place. 
 In section §2 we advanced a brief clarification of Being and saw that one of 
Heidegger’s remarks about Dasein is that it lives in constant Sorge, Caring about the 
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future possibilities of its own Being. If existing (ex-sistere) is to be always outside 
oneself, looking for the possibilities of our own Being, then what we would call the 
“mental processes” of that Being are also out there, outside one’s body. Just as Gregory 
Bateson argued (1987, 461–65), what we call consciousness or mind is not restricted by 
the skin; on the contrary, it should encompass the phenomenon we wish to understand 
or explain – what he calls the “organism-in-its-environment” (1987, 458). In this 
connection, the ‘extension of consciousness’ refers to the act of being practically 
engaged in the world, not to an idealization or mental representation of an object. If we 
understand Being as a relation with and towards something, speaking of ‘extension of 
consciousness’ implies taking into account the paths leading to what we are engaged 
with and the meanings that spring forth through those paths (Bateson 1987, 465). 
 The idea of landscape as an extension of consciousness should be considered 
bearing in mind the notions of ‘Being’ and ‘consciousness’ referred to above. The 
landscape is conceived not only as this particular place I inhabit and that physically 
surrounds me, but through the engagements and actions that express my relationship 
with other humans and places – like the kachō’s remarks on the idea of furusato. 
Existing in a continuous web of relationships with other human beings, places and 
things, this ‘extension of consciousnesses’ is not an individual or mental state, but the 
consummation of our own relations with others, the ways those relations evolve and, 
together with the actions of others, how they convey a sense of belonging. In Japanese 
society, the machizukuri (community-building) initiatives are one good example of that: 
an articulation of communitarian actions promoting small-scale changes in common 
spaces, whose roots go back, probably, to a strong communitarian ethics existing prior 
to the World Wars (Sorensen e Funck 2007; Sorensen et al. 2009). 
 The landscape and places we live in are both constituted by these relations and 
are themselves “imbued with the vitality that animates its inhabitants” (Ingold 2002a, 
149). In other words, the landscape also comprises how a sense of belonging to a 
community takes shape through the “extensions” that constitute both our daily tasks – 
what Ingold (2002b) called taskscape – and the moral bonds of respect and 
responsibility we articulate with each other by inhabiting a common world, without 
being necessarily bounded by the human eye, some trees, roads or mountains. 
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§6. Caring for a common world - final thoughts 
Throughout this essay, we tried to attend to how the landscape was articulated 
by people in Kazemura by adding a phenomenological light to it and ended up 
reflecting, not on judgments or features that could be attributed to a certain physical 
place, but on human relationality conveyed, in this case, through a sense of 
intergenerational responsibility, work, tasks and the community maintenance; i.e., by 
bringing to light our sometimes forgotten condition that, whether we care for it or not, 
whether in a distant or proximate sense, we inhabit a common world. 
By setting aside the common critical discourses that obscured the ontological 
potentiality of the Japanese idea of furusato, we started our inquiry by unveiling the 
moral dimension that lies implicit in it, as exposed by the kachō’s words. This morality, 
in turn, becomes manifest in how people, acting out of respect towards the previous 
generations and responsibility towards the next generations, dedicate themselves to 
growing their community – ultimately, we are talking about an attitude of respect for 
what exists in the world. Edward Relph called it “environmental humility”: not to be 
understood as an eulogy of nature nor as submission to ecological laws, but as a mode 
of being that respects “what there is in the world and seeks to protect it and even 
enhance it without denying its essential character or right to existence” (1981, 19).  Far 
from the reifying attitude implicit in conceptions such as ‘cultural landscape’ or ‘world 
heritage’, ‘environmental humility’ (where ‘environment’ comprises places, buildings, 
people and things) conveys a multitude of ways of treating the world, where one “works 
with environments and circumstances rather than trying to manipulate and dominate 
them” (1981, 162 emphasis added). Relph’s environmental humility, as well as the 
morality underpinning the idea of furusato, is, first and foremost, a moral and practical 
orientation towards what exists in a common world and implies not just human beings, 
but literally everything. 
However, to imply the ‘human’ when talking about landscape is not simply to 
repeat the old dictum that humans shape the land with their actions and tools. The gist 
of this idea is that apart from the landscape’s physical dimension (rivers, trees, 
mountains, and buildings) there is a human dimension that manifests itself, first of all, 
in the moral relation that gradually develops among a certain community’s inhabitants. 
Building on that, we refocused our attention from landscape to humans, reversing the 
‘step ahead’, and started our inquiry from the stage ‘how the landscape is perceived in 
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them’. Which means that, to arrive at some kind of inference about a possible 
understanding of the landscape within this community, we should focus, first of all, in 
their daily life and begin, not from what people say about the landscape, but from how 
the landscape reveals itself in their actions, routines or conversations – in ‘practical 
intentionality’. 
This possibility led us to rethink work ethics. Here, it would have been futile any 
attempt to engage in any sort of explanation or rationalization of the attitude towards 
work, observed in Kazemura, through Japanese cultural concepts, the idea of ‘working 
mentality’ and so on. Instead, this was done through a direct comprehension of these 
people’s lives in the acts of work itself, setting aside notions of work informed by 
Marxist ideas of productivity – the economic dimension of work – and thinking it, as 
Ingold invites us to do, as an act of growing, as in growing a child. In this regard, the 
‘Being-landscape’ relation should be thought of, for example, in light of the relationship 
we have with our own children: grown and nurtured through a direct and sentient 
involvement with them. What life in Kazemura disclosed is that the ‘Being-landscape’ 
relationship is fostered by a diligent attitude of commitment, dedication and struggle; 
but it is also continually reinforced by the prospect of enjoying, appreciating and talking 
about the fruits of that same dedication and effort – and, sometimes, even to celebrate 
them. 
The morality described so far thrives, not as some kind of a Japanese cultural 
trait, but because it has as its substance the place where these people live. Diligence, 
responsibility, hardships, pleasure and the aesthetics of speech – all these notions are 
perfectly compatible when human beings see, right in front of them, the fruits of his 
own actions, day after day, season after season, year after year. When these actions 
manifest themselves in a communitarian context and develop through a continuous, 
fruitful and intimate community management, done by our own hands, the bonds we 
create with both places and people are reinforced as well. Therefore, being able to grow 
and care for a common world allow us to keep – or reclaim – our psychological, 
affective and moral bonds with it. 
Human existence, as articulated by Dasein’s Being, implies existing outside 
itself, in a continuous relational engagement with other human beings, places and things. 
And the places we inhabit comprise also how a sense of belonging to a community 
gradually takes shape through our common tasks – without being necessarily bounded 
by the human eye or by those trees or mountains over there. We can almost say that the 
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landscape can be thought of, not only as a physical place, but also through an awareness 
of our own connections with others and through our independent and common actions. 
If we think about the connections between human beings, the tasks they engage in and 
the places where they do it, the landscape turns out to be more than only the material 
environment within our eyes reach and discloses itself as a more comprehensive 
awareness of our own belonging to a common world. 
 
 
And what you thought you came for 
Is only a shell, a husk of meaning  
From which the purpose breaks only when it is fulfilled  
If at all. Either you had no purpose  
Or the purpose is beyond the end you figured  
And is altered in fulfilment. 
T.S Eliot, Little Gidding 
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